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THE LIBERAL STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
RELIGIOUS VISIONS OF EDUCATION 
JAMES G. DWYERt 
The principal papers in this symposium offer a rich account 
of religious perspectives on education. They impress on the 
reader the great variety of views across and within religious 
traditions. Significantly, each of the authors, to varying degrees, 
emphasizes that many people, within the particular religious 
tradition he or she addresses, and in some cases institutional 
authorities as well, embrace liberal educational aims. Some go so 
far as to assert or imply that liberal educational practices 
predominate within a tradition. 
Liberal educational practices, as articulated by certain 
liberal political theorists, 1 include not just developing basic 
skills-such as reading, writing, and arithmetic-and providing 
information in a variety of subject areas. They also include 
developing advanced intellectual skills, such as critical and 
independent thinking, problem solving, investigative methods in 
the sciences and humanities, and synthesis of complex 
information. They include instruction in broader principles and 
theories in various subject areas and, at some level of schooling, 
open debate about the validity of the principles and the 
soundness of the theories. They encourage creativity and 
original thinking. At appropriate developmental stages, they 
expose students to competing views, secular and religious, on 
contested issues in the various academic disciplines and in public 
policy, and they afford children a substantial measure of freedom 
of expression to deliberate about the respective merits of the 
competing views, while at the same time expecting students to 
articulate reasons for their own positions, whether they conform 
tProfessor ofLaw, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
1 See HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1-18 (2000) 
(discussing the interplay between liberalism and educational policy). See generally 
MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999} (discussing 
liberalism and the modification of the liberal education ideal, and proposing steps to 
implement an autonomy-promoting liberal education). 
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with mainstream views or not. In these and other ways, liberal 
educators treat children with respect as unique, valuable, and 
equal persons. Liberals endorse this type of education because 
they believe it is most conducive to giving children an 
opportunity for enjoying a happy and fulfilling life, as well as 
being a requisite for becoming autonomous. Some liberals also, 
or instead, emphasize that this type of education is most 
conducive to children becoming good citizens in a liberal 
democracy. 
Two things are significant about the other participants' 
efforts to portray attitudes toward children's schooling among 
members of particular religious groups as largely liberal. One is 
that they are unsupported; the authors do not cite empirical 
studies showing what portion of people or what percentage of 
schools within a religious group hold to certain beliefs about 
children's education. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
such studies. Thus, quantitative claims about the degree to 
which liberal or illiberal views prevail in the educational 
philosophy or classroom instruction of any religious group today 
really cannot be supported. I return to this point below. 
The second way in which the emphasis on liberal views is 
significant is that the authors offer no explanation for it-that is, 
for why they believe it is important that many people within a 
faith hold relatively liberal views, or why they think this should 
be of interest to their readers, including those outside the faith 
they examine. What business is it of the other authors or of their 
audience whether most Muslims or Jews or Christians in the 
United States or elsewhere provide children in the schools they 
operate with a liberal education, an illiberal education, an 
exclusively religious education, or any other kind of education? 
So long as they are not encouraging children to engage in 
violence or other harmful conduct, and so long as they are not 
producing graduates incapable of being self-sufficient, why 
should any other private party or the state care what or how they 
teach the children or presume to pass judgment on them? Yet 
one gets the sense from each paper that the author is valorizing 
liberal approaches to education, and it would have been of 
interest for them to explain how they would respond to a 
defender of illiberal childrearing practices who charged them 
with failing to respect the entitlement of all parents to raise their 
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children as their convictions instruct them, without critical 
scrutiny from presumptuous academics. 
Also of significance in the principal papers is that none of the 
authors deny that there are some schools within the faith 
tradition he or she addresses that follow illiberal practices, such 
as discouraging children from thinking critically and 
independently; stifling self-expression and any inclination to 
question the received wisdom in the sciences, in the humanities, 
or in the religious tradition; and imposing gender-stereotyped 
roles on students. At least two of the authors, Professors 
Afsaruddin and Smolin, explicitly acknowledge that there are 
illiberal elements within the groups they describe. Yet this 
acknowledgment is left to recede into the background, not 
followed by serious consideration of whether someone should do 
something about the existence of any such schools, or of whether 
the children subjected to illiberal schooling have some claim on 
the rest of society that we are failing to recognize. At best, some 
of the other authors endeavor just to convince readers that 
illiberal practices are not too widespread. 
My own interest is in questions of political theory raised by 
the existence of any schools with illiberal practices-that is, 
questions concerning the state's stance toward illiberal schooling. 
I am curious about the content and style of theological arguments 
and analyses concerning child rearing, but I am not competent to 
enter into them, so I confine myself to writing about how the 
state should respond to them. I approach these questions as a 
legal academic with an increasingly tenuous claim also to be a 
political philosopher. I approach them, moreover, as an advocate 
for children, a sincere and well-intentioned one, but by no means 
an omniscient one. From the latter perspective, I assume that 
the life of each child matters morally and therefore that the rest 
of us, and by implication the state as our agent, should be 
concerned about any harmful childrearing practices, even if they 
affect only one child. Thus, it is irrelevant from my perspective 
whether most or only a few children within Islam, Judaism, 
Catholicism, or Evangelical Christianity, in the United States or 
elsewhere, receive a form of schooling that is contrary to some of 
their interests. 2 
2 For the same reason, I deem it irrelevant to state regulatory decision making 
what standardized tests-even if they were designed to detect the more important 
aspects of a liberal education identified above, which they are not-reveal about 
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In my book, Religious Schools u. Children's Rights, published 
in 1998, I summarized the empirical research on Catholic and 
conservative Christian schools that had been done up to that 
point and noted that the record was scant and dated; there 
simply had not been much study of those schools, especially not 
in recent years.3 This was itself significant to my mind, that the 
state did not take enough interest in the quality of education 
received by the 10 percent of children who do not attend public 
schools to examine closely the practices of private schools. 
However, what studies had been done by outside observers were 
more or less consistent in identifying illiberal practices in some 
schools, and I suggested in the book that even this scant and 
dated record should be enough to make the state and the public 
take notice precisely because every child matters-no child 
should be left behind.4 At a minimum, it seemed it should induce 
states to do some independent investigation of their own to either 
confirm or refute the depictions in these studies. 
There is no reason to believe today that illiberal schooling 
practices have disappeared, given that much of American society, 
and much of Evangelical Christianity in particular, appears to 
have moved in a more conservative direction in the past decade. 
Illiberal attitudes manifested by the leadership of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, which represents at least 15 million 
Americans, and of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
surely receive support from and filter back down to a large 
segment of the population. These attitudes include opposition to 
women assuming leadership roles and a determination to stifle 
those who would question this or other positions of the 
leadership.5 Presumably, such discriminatory and authoritarian 
average student performance in different categories of schools such as private versus 
public. It is no more logical to conclude from comparable outcomes in those two 
sectors that all is well in all private schools than it is to conclude that all is well in 
all public schools. 
3 JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 13-14 (1998). 
4 See id. at 7-44. 
5 See BATI'LE FOR THE MINDS (New Day Films 1996) (depicting the conservative 
takeover of the Convention and the Seminary in a documentary film); see also BARRY 
HANKINS, UNEASY IN BABYLON: SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONSERVATIVES AND AMERICAN 
CULTURE 200-39 (2002); JULIE INGERSOLL, EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN WOMEN: WAR 
STORIES IN THE GENDER BATTLES 47-59 (2003); CARLL. KELL & L. RAYMOND CAMP, 
IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER: THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW SOUTHERN BAPTIST 
CONVENTION 77-96 (1999); DAVID T. MORGAN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST SISTERS: IN 
SEARCH OF STATUS, 1845--2000, at 160-62 (2003); JERRY SUTTON, THE BAPTIST 
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attitudes influence the pedagogical approaches and curricular 
content of some schools that Evangelical Christians operate.6 
The Catholic Church and Catholic schooling in the United 
States have gone through significant changes in recent decades 
towards a more liberal approach from all appearances. 7 There 
might, therefore, be little for liberals to be concerned about today 
with respect to Catholic schooling, though the fact that the 
Church is still characterized by quite visible de jure patriarchy 
suggests at least some lingering cause for concern about what 
children in Catholic schools learn about gender equality. My 
perception is that there are still archly conservative groups 
within Judaism and Islam in the United States that operate 
schools characterized by pronounced gender discrimination and a 
pedagogical approach antithetical to development toward moral 
autonomy. Again, though, it is irrelevant to an analysis of the 
state's responsibility to children whether there are thousands of 
schools with illiberal practices or only a few, and I doubt that any 
reasonable and informed person would claim that there are no 
such schools. 
In my first book, I also expressed the view that it is 
irrelevant to an analysis of the state's responsibility to children 
whether schools that have some harmful practices also provide 
things for children that the state deems valuable.8 To take an 
extreme and, so far as I know, entirely hypothetical example, one 
might imagine a school that does all of the things I listed above 
as constitutive of a liberal education, but in which teachers and 
administrators routinely sexually abuse children. Surely we 
would all say that the state should stop the sexual abuse and not 
refrain from doing so because the school is otherwise providing a 
good education. So, in my view, it was enough to generate a 
REFORMATION: THE CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE IN THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST 
CONVENTION 259-61 (2000). 
6 See FRANCES R.A. PATERSON, DEMOCRACY AND INTOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN 
SCHOOL CURRICULA, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14-21 (2003). 
1 See generally CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AT THE CROSSROADS: SURVIVAL AND 
TRANSFORMATION (James Youniss & John J. Convey eds., 2000) (containing various 
essays on contemporary changes in modern Catholic education); THE 
CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC SCHOOL: CONTEXT, IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY (Terence H. 
McLaughlin et al. eds., 1996) (including various essays regarding the context, 
identity, and progression of Catholic schools); ANDREW M. GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC 
REVOLUTION: NEW WINE, OLD WINESKINS, AND THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL 
(2003). 
8 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 15. 
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philosophical analysis of the state's responsibility to the children 
in private schools if there was reason to believe that at least one 
private school in the country was engaging in at least one 
practice that the state believed to be harmful. 
I also deemed irrelevant what goes on in nonreligious 
schools, including public schools.9 To return to the extreme 
hypothetical example above, if the state became aware of routine 
sexual abuse in a particular religious school, it would clearly be 
inappropriate for the state to say, "we have no business worrying 
about those children, because there are some public schools 
where this goes on as well." Looked at another way, it should be 
no defense for the administrators of the religious school to say, 
"some public schools do this, so we should be free to do so until 
you stop them." If the state deems certain practices harmful to 
children, then of course it should endeavor to eliminate them 
from all public ·schools, but I cannot imagine a sound argument 
for the conclusion that until it does so completely, the state must 
ignore the situation of children in private schools. 
But why was I personally interested in what might seem to 
be a relatively minor social problem, if it is a problem at all, in a 
world where large numbers of children suffer from poverty, 
physical abuse, parental drug addiction, value-destroying 
television programming, and unhealthy diets? One reason was 
that questions about the state's stance toward childrearing 
practices it deems harmful, when the practices are motivated by 
religious conviction, provide a great intellectual challenge. No 
one should act as if the answers are simple and as if anyone who 
does not agree with them is simpleminded or malicious. At 
times, my own writing on the subject has had a polemical tone to 
it, and I regret that. As noted below, personal experience also 
motivated my interest in the topic, and that personal experience 
included inculcation of dogmatic attitudes. These questions were 
sufficiently difficult to answer, that they preoccupied many 
political theorists throughout the 1990s, and no clear consensus 
emerged. I found much of the analysis of those questions to be 
misguided, and I thought that I had something different and 
better to say, principally concerning the rights-based arguments 
that were often made. I addressed my own arguments to liberal 
political theorists, and I did not expect that anyone not operating 
9 ld. 
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from the perspective of liberal political theory would find much in 
it persuasive. I am very glad to have the opportunity now, in this 
journal, to address a readership that I assume to have a 
primarily religious orientation, though this is not incompatible 
with also endorsing or operating within the perspective of liberal 
political theory. I will endeavor to speak more directly to 
thoughts and concerns that the readers of this journal might 
have, while recognizing that I likely will not address them all 
and that I might still be unpersuasive. 
Another reason why this topic interested me, if I might wax 
autobiographical for a paragraph, is that I spent seventeen years 
in Catholic educational institutions: a preschool at a convent, a 
parochial elementary school, a diocesan high school, and a Jesuit 
university. I had some thoughts afterward about the quality of 
the education I received and about the ways in which teachers 
and administrators treated pupils in the elementary and 
secondary schools I attended, some positive thoughts and some 
negative. Working through a philosophical analysis of the legal 
environment in which those schools operated was one way of 
expressing and working through these thoughts. These thoughts 
were tied to others about being raised in a staunchly 
conservative Catholic family, in a pervasively Catholic 
community, and about my own intense experience with 
Catholicism throughout my childhood, adolescence, and early 
adulthood, an experience that led me in my early twenties to a 
decision, later reversed, that I would enter the priesthood. 
Because of these experiences with Catholicism, I thought I might 
be able to offer something to the debate among liberal political 
theorists that few others could-namely, the perspective of 
someone who was raised in a pervasive and illiberal religious 
environment and who was once deeply immersed in Christian 
faith and theology. I cannot say that many, or any, other 
political theorists are "a product of an intellectual formation 
largely ignorant of the substantial Christian intellectual 
heritage" or are incapable of understanding "how any intelligent 
person of good will can be either a traditionalist Catholic or 
Evangelical Christian," as Professor Smolin charges, 10 but I can 
say that neither is true of me. 
10 David M. Smolin, Religion, Education, and the Theoretically Liberal State: 
Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99 
(2005). 
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What then to make of schools that, as a direct outgrowth of 
the sincere religious beliefs of their operators and of the parents 
that patronize them, reject liberal educational aims and/or 
engage in practices like sexist teaching that liberals believe 
harmful to children? The adults involved presumably care about 
the children, want the best for them, and are doing the best they 
can by their own lights. Are they entitled to be left alone, absent 
infliction of grievous physical harm on the children, as a matter 
of religious freedom or parental rights? Or does the state have a 
right to insist that all children receive more or less the same kind 
of schooling, a right based perhaps on a perceived need to 
produce a certain kind of citizen to populate and support a 
particular kind of society? Or do children have any claims on 
their parents or on the state to ensure that they receive a 
particular sort of education and are not treated in certain ways? 
One general approach to answering these questions might be 
to consult one's own ethical convictions, which for m·ost people in 
the United States would be tied to religious beliefs. As a political 
philosopher, though, what interests me is not what personal 
opinions I or anyone else might form about these questions on 
the basis of religious conviction or any other set of beliefs, but 
rather how legal decision makers should answer them. This 
latter inquiry should interest everyone, including those who 
ordinarily think about children's upbringing exclusively within 
the framework of their own religious faith. For ultimately the 
state must answer these questions, and its answers to them must 
be what determines whether illiberal schools are able to continue 
operating as they have. A fatal weakness in much of the 
theorizing and rhetoric about legal conflicts over illiberal child-
rearing practices is the failure to recognize this-the failure to 
see that the state is inevitably pervasively involved in the lives of 
children and other non-autonomous persons. How other people 
treat children and what practical authority anyone has over the 
lives of children must be governed by laws, and it is the state 
that creates laws. All participants in debates over these conflicts 
are demanding some kind of legal rule. Defenders of freedom for 
parents and religious communities are asking that the state 
confer a particular set of legal rights on parents and 
communities, a right to direct children's lives as they wish. 
Whatever moral rights or natural rights they might believe they 
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possess, in practice what they need and want to raise children as 
they wish are state-created legal rights. 
Thus, what opponents of regulation and oversight of 
religious childrearing practices are really demanding is not state 
inaction, as is sometimes suggested, but rather a different form 
of state action, a conferral on them of broader legal authority 
over the lives of children. For the state truly to "stay out of child 
rearing" would mean no regulatory oversight of private schools or 
other sites of child rearing, but it would also mean that no adults 
have any legal basis for retaining custody of or control over any 
children, and so could claim no protection against any efforts by 
other private parties or by the children themselves to interfere 
with their efforts to direct the children's lives. All children would 
be up for grabs, susceptible to the influence and even physical 
possession of any adult able to come into contact with them. 
Surely this is not what anyone wants. No one truly wants the 
state to stay out of child rearing. What everyone wants is that 
the state govern child rearing in a particular way, assigning 
custody to particular adults and conferring some degree of power 
to direct a child's upbringing on those adults. Disagreement 
turns principally on how much power the state should give those 
adults and, conversely, how much power it should assign to other 
private parties or retain in its own agencies. Whatever one's 
position, it is a position about what the state should do and about 
what laws should exist. As such, arguments for it must be 
addressed to the state and must be ones that the state can ado~~ 
for itself. 
What then should the state make of these various religious 
visions of education? How, if at all, should awareness of those 
visions influence state decision making? As an initial matter, I 
believe that the readers of this journal will agree that the state in 
this nation may not adopt one of those religious visions per se as 
its own. In other words, a legislature may not declare that 
henceforth its educational policy will be dictated by the teachings 
of the Catholic Church or by the Koran. This would be so even if 
all the members of a legislature were themselves Catholics or 
Muslims. In their jobs as legislators, they are agents for the 
entire populace, and the populace is heterogeneous with respect 
to religious belief, with a significant percentage of the population 
being nonreligious. In recognition of this ideological diversity, 
and of the fact that life goes better for everyone when the state 
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takes no side in disputations over religious questions, we in 
America have created and continue to endorse a so-called 
"secular state," meaning at least a state that is not affiliated with 
any religious institution and that does not endorse particular 
religious beliefs per se or take positions on religious questions. 
This does not make the liberal state value-neutral, but the state 
compensates for its adopting a secular rather than theocratic 
character by leaving substantial space in private life for persons 
of faith to direct their own lives by their own lights. 
Does this mean that state actors must, in their deliberations 
and decision making, entirely ignore statements of a religious 
vision of education? No. Does it mean that state actors must 
assume that children have no spiritual interests and should not 
be taught religious beliefs? No. What it means is simply that 
state actors are constrained to make decisions about what laws 
will govern children's lives on bases other than religious belief. 
In doing so, they certainly may take into account that most 
citizens, including most of the adults upon whom the state has 
conferred the status of legal parenthood, have religious beliefs, 
including beliefs that children have spiritual interests of a 
particular sort. But in their official capacity, state actors may 
not themselves assume that any of those beliefs are true and, on 
that basis, act in accordance with them. If they did so they would 
of course have to pick and choose, and any selected beliefs would 
conflict with others that some persons hold fervently. This might 
inhibit the religious freedom or sense of belonging of those 
persons. Selected beliefs might also conflict with the beliefs that 
today's children will hold later in their lives. State actors must 
instead seek out and base their decisions about laws and policies 
on secular values and beliefs. 11 Among those secular values 
would be life, liberty; and the pursuit of happiness. And among 
those secular beliefs would be an understanding that most people 
place great importance on religious freedom among all the 
liberties, and that experiences of spirituality and religious 
devotion produce great happiness for many people. 
If what is at issue were simply how adults should conduct 
their own lives, state decision makers would not have much 
difficulty in establishing basic rules of conduct. Based on 
11 I consider below the fact that these values and beliefs are not universal, and 
the fact that some so-called secular values might be tied to, and even originate in, 
religious belief. 
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reasoning of the sort John Stuart Mill offered for maximizing 
human happiness or the reasoning of the sort John Locke and, in 
our own day, John Rawls presented for respecting the autonomy 
of persons, state actors would establish a scheme of legally 
protected, extensive personal liberty in matters of religious belief 
and exercise. That liberty would be limited only to the extent 
necessary to ensure that all autonomous persons, as moral 
equals, enjoy an equal measure of liberty, and to prevent persons 
from inflicting tangible harms on others. This is, more or less, 
the scheme that the United States Supreme Court has fashioned 
over time in its First Amendment jurisprudence. Difficulty 
arises at the margins, especially where there is disagreement 
about what constitutes harm to others and where specific 
religious beliefs or practices conflict with public projects like 
eradicating drug use or building roads.12 For the most part 
though, the boundaries of religious freedom outside the context of 
child rearing are well established and uncontroversial, and the 
vast majority of Americans are able to exercise their religious 
beliefs without ever coming into conflict with other private 
parties or the state. 
The problem in the context of education is that child rearing 
is not about adults conducting just their own lives. It is about 
their directing the lives of children. So then the question arises 
as to how the state should view children-as equivalent or 
analogous to property or appendages of parents, or as separate 
persons. If the former, then child rearing might not require a 
different kind of analysis or set of legal rules relative to those 
pertaining to adults' self-determination. Parents might have the 
legal power to do whatever they want with children so long as 
they do not cause harm to persons outside the family. But if the 
latter is true, serious thought would need to be given to the 
implications of children's separate personhood, including 
whether parental behavior toward children should be treated in 
some ways like adults' behavior in relation to persons who are 
12 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (rejecting a free -
exercise challenge to the denial of unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired 
for ingesting peyote in violation of state law); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (rejecting a Native American tribe's free 
exercise challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's construction of a logging road through 
land sacred to the tribe). 
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not "their" children, such as other competent adults, incompetent 
adults, and other children. 
It would certainly be easier to answer the question of 
children's status as property or persons if one could appeal to a 
clear statement on the issue from some authoritative text. In 
some religious traditions there might be some statement of this 
sort in a religious text. But the question here is how the state 
should view children, and even on so fundamental a question as 
who has personhood status in our society, we should all be 
uncomfortable about state actors adopting a religious authority 
as their own, even if today it would be a religious authority that 
we personally share. We should be uncomfortable about it not 
only because tomorrow it might be a religious authority that we 
do not share and that takes a position directly contrary to our 
own convictions, including one that excludes us from the category 
of persons, but also because of the impact it would likely have on 
some fellow members of our society who are from a different 
religious tradition and whose equal personhood and citizenship 
we respect. We should all prefer that the state appeal to some 
nonreligious basis for taking a position on the status of children 
and other beings, including ourselves, at least so long as that 
basis generates conclusions not too dissimilar from our personal 
views. But what if there is no other basis? There is certainly no 
statement on the issue in our written social contract-that is, the 
Constitution. Where else is a legislator to look? 
In a forthcoming book, I develop a nonreligious account of 
children's moral status that the state could endorse, by 
cataloging the characteristics of beings that ordinarily cause 
human moral agents to have basic intuitions that other beings 
matter morally. 13 I conclude on that basis that the moral status 
of children, in general, is actually higher than that of adults, and, 
accordingly, that their interests should receive greater weight in 
our moral deliberations than those of adults. This is consistent 
with the intuition that many parents have with respect to their 
own children, that their children's interests matter more morally 
than do their own, and my analysis would generate a similar 
view at a collective, societal level. I cannot reproduce that 
analysis here, and I would not claim that it is likely to convince 
13 See JAMES G. DWYER, ON THE SUPERIORITY OF YOUTH: MORAL STATUS AND 
How WE TREAT CHILDREN (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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many people. But really it would seem unnecessary to argue the 
point here, for there is no suggestion by the other participants in 
the symposium, and I anticipate none from the journal's readers, 
that children are not persons or that the state should treat 
children as if they were property or appendages of their parents 
rather than as morally distinct persons. 
In fact, there would appear to be an "overlapping consensus" 
among people from a broad range of moral outlooks on the 
proposition that children, though not autonomous, 14 are persons, 
and on the assumption that children, though dependent upon 
and psychologically and emotionally intertwined with their 
parents an~ other family members, are morally distinct persons. 
Such an overlapping consensus might itself consti~ute a basis for 
state actors adopting those assumptions. That children occupy a 
superior moral status is not widely believed, however, so I will 
assume for the present just that children are equal persons 
which means that state actors must afford them respect equal to 
that given other persons, and must assign their interests weight 
equal to that accorded interests of adults. This is not equivalent 
to saying that children should be treated the same way adults 
are treated, with all the same freedoms and responsibilities that 
adults possess; in fact, because their interests differ in important 
respects from those of adults, giving equal consideration to their 
interests would require treating them differently in important 
ways. 
Therefore, if you, the reader, were a legislator contemplating 
the situation of children in your jurisdiction who are being raised 
by parents of greatly diverse ideological perspectives, you would 
need to figure out what legal rights, if any, those children should 
have with respect to their education given the assumption that 
they are morally equal, yet non-autonomous, persons. To do 
that, you must adopt some assumptions about what is good and 
bad for them. You must make such assumptions with respect to 
other aspects of their lives as well. For example, you must decide 
whether whipping of or intercourse with a ten year-old child is 
good or bad for him or her. On what basis would you decide such 
things? 
14 For the sake of simplicity I confine my analysis here to elementary school 
aged children and put aside consideration of older children who are closer to being 
autonomous. 
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Importantly, no decision you reach on any aspect of 
children's welfare is likely to be consistent with the preferences 
of 100 percent of your constituents. Indeed, if there were no 
inclination in any persons to do a certain thing to a child, there 
would be no need for you, as a legislator, to make any decision 
about it. And as to just about any aspect of children's lives, a 
decision you make about what is good and bad will conflict with 
preferences of some people that are grounded in religious belief. 
As to just about every item in a state's child welfare laws and 
regulations, one could find someone somewhere who says that his 
or her religion commands doing what the law prohibits or not 
doing what the law commands. So every decision you make as a 
legislator about children's welfare is likely to conflict with 
someone's sincere convictions. This is true of legal regulations 
more generally, including others pertaining to family life, such as 
restrictions on how spouses may treat each other, as well as laws 
governing treatment of co-workers and employees, laws 
prohibiting discrimination on various bases in public places, laws 
concerning sexual freedom, and so forth. What are you to do? 
One response to recognition of this problem would be to 
create an exception to every rule for anyone who has a religious 
objection, or any sort of ideological objection, or who simply does 
not want to comply. This would, of course, eviscerate the rule to 
a large degree, or completely, depending on the breadth of the 
exception. At the extreme, it would mean laws apply only to 
those who do not want to do what is proscribed anyway. More 
importantly, it would be difficult to justify doing this in terms of 
children's welfare. Because you cannot, as a state actor, adopt 
the views of parents who object on religious grounds, nor assume 
that their beliefs are true, you would need some other reason to 
conclude that those children should not receive legal protection of 
the interests that you assume, based on secular beliefs about the 
world and human welfare, children typically possess. And this is 
where your thinking as a legislator becomes philosophically 
interesting. What reasons can you legitimately adopt for 
sacrificing what you believe, based on empirical information 
supplied to you by child welfare professionals and researchers, to 
be an aspect of children's welfare? 
One reason might be that you do not have great confidence 
in your beliefs about children's welfare, perhaps because there is 
not widespread consensus among those with secular views on the 
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subject. Child development scholars and researchers, or other 
professionals, might disagree about whether a certain input into 
children's lives is beneficial or whether a certain way of treating 
them is harmful. There is substantial disagreement on secular 
grounds, for example, about the use of phonics-based instruction 
for reading, about the value of certain vaccinations for any 
individual child, and about the wisdom of giving extraordinarily 
active children suppressants like Ritalin. 
I do not believe, however, that there is substantial 
disagreement on secular grounds about the value for children of 
any aspect of the liberal education I described above. In 
particular, autonomy is quite widely regarded in our society as 
an important good for humans. In fact, I doubt that those who 
would oppose the kind of education I described would say that 
autonomy in general is not good; they would likely claim that 
they themselves are autonomous and so acknowledge that being 
autonomous is a good thing. Many even couch their objection to 
limitations on their childrearing choices, mistakenly, as a matter 
of their autonomy. This is a mistaken, even conceptually 
incoherent, claim because autonomy means self-determination, 
and controlling another person's life, whether it is one's child or 
one's spouse or one's neighbor, is not self-determination. There is 
also widespread agreement among those operating from a secular 
perspective on what sort of preparation is needed to attend the 
better-regarded universities and to pursue various careers, and 
on the negative consequences for girls, and boys, of being 
subjected to sexist teaching. 15 
Defenders of illiberal schooling practices might instead 
contend that the need for their children, throughout their lives, 
to believe the tenets of their parents' faith so that they can enjoy 
whatever spiritual benefits come from being believers, is of 
greater importance than the children's becoming autonomous or 
being able to pursue professional careers or feeling free to reject 
traditional gender roles. However, this is a position that you, as 
a legislator, cannot share. There is no secular basis for 
concluding that any person must hold a particular set of religious 
beliefs throughout his or her life. Alternatively, they might 
15 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 8-10; James G. Dwyer, The Children We 
Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of 
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1332-38 
(1996) (discussing the harm students incur from sexist instruction). 
210 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:195 
contend that their preferred form of schooling is more conducive 
to a child's becoming autonomous later in life than is what I have 
described as a liberal education. This contention you, as a 
legislator, would have to regard as implausible because it is 
contrary to the prevailing views of educational theorists who 
operate within a secular perspective and contrary to the 
legislative findings underlying existing statutory and 
administrative rules for the public schools that educate 90 
percent of children. There can be reasonable disagreement on 
secular grounds about some pedagogical details, such as the 
precise age at which it is best to present children with particular 
sorts of challenges, and everyone should be free to voice their 
views about such things. However, there is no plausible basis for 
contending that schooling with basic aims and orientation largely 
or entirely antithetical to that described above is as conducive as 
a liberal education to fostering autonomy and to affording 
children with an equal opportunity to pursue careers and ways of 
life consistent with their talents, abilities, and freely-endorsed 
conception of the good. As I stated at the outset, the other 
participants in the symposium appear to concede this by their 
implicit or explicit valorizing of liberal education. 
It bears emphasis here that the prescription for liberal 
education that I outlined at the outset does not preclude religious 
instruction, and in none of my writings have I suggested that no 
school should be able to teach religion or that religious school 
teachers or parents should themselves be prohibited from trying 
to advance what they understand to be children's spiritual 
interests. Rather, I concluded that the state, based on 
suppositions about the temporal well-being of children, should 
require every school to allow students some opportunity to 
question religious teachings, in a respectful manner, if and when 
the students become so inclined, and to foster critical thinking 
skills in children more generally, using some subject matter for 
that purpose but not necessarily religious instruction. 16 In fact, 
in my second book, I argued that the state not only may, bu·t 
must provide financial assistance to religious schools-that is, to 
schools that teach religious beliefs to students, as well as to other 
private schools, so long as the schools are also providing secular 
instruction in the standard subjects and providing other 
16 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 180. 
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components of a liberal education, and so long as the funding 
would be used to improve the secular components of the 
education provided. 17 I based this argument not on supposed 
rights of parents, as most proponents of school vouchers have 
done, but rather on the equal protection rights of the children 
whose parents place them in religious schools. I argued that the 
state violates the rights of children in religious schools not only 
by failing to exercise oversight of the schools' educational 
practices, but also by denying these children a share of the state's 
funding of education.18 
Moreover, I did not include among the aims of liberal 
education disabusing children of religious faith, but rather 
included the aim of ensuring that all children would progress 
toward autonomy and ultimately become capable of critically 
examining their beliefs and making a free and informed decision 
as to whether they would continue to hold the beliefs that their 
parents and schools taught them. I know of no philosopher today 
who denies that children need some set of beliefs and values 
initially given to them, on the basis of which they can form an 
initial self-conception and evaluate other beliefs and values. 19 I 
did contend, however, that some religious beliefs are, from a 
secular perspective, inherently bad for children to have instilled 
in them-for example, a belief that females are morally or 
socially inferior to males, or are less suitable than males for 
positions of leadership or for the various professions.20 The 
reader can undoubtedly think of other examples of things that 
the state should deem harmful to teach children. As such, I 
suggested that ideally a liberal state would proscribe teaching 
such beliefs to children altogether, though in practice it might be 
counterproductive from a secular child welfare perspective to try 
17 JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH 
TO EDUCATION REFORM 161-63 (2002). 
18 See id. at 159-67. 
19 See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF 
MARRIAGE 15-29 (1999) (providing an account of how autonomy works, with a 
person holding most of his or her values, beliefs, and commitments constant and 
unquestioned-that is, taking an "internal stance" toward them-while subjecting 
some subset of all his or her values, beliefs, or commitments to critical scrutiny-
that is, taking an "external stance" toward them). I am not familiar with the idea of 
"radical autonomy" that Professor Smolin attacks. 
20 See DWYER, supra note 17, at 12, 184-85. 
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to enforce such a proscription, at least in the home, because it 
would require too great an interference with family life.21 
I also contended, importantly, that allowing parents 
extensive freedom to convey their religious beliefs to their 
children when the children are not in school, and allowing 
private schools substantial freedom to convey religious beliefs as 
well, subject to the requirements noted above, creates more than 
enough opportunity for parents and religious communities to 
instill their beliefs and values in children.22 What a liberal 
approach to child-rearing rules out are simply measures designed 
to prevent children ever from questioning beliefs given to them 
and from ultimately reaching their own independent conclusions 
about matters of faith and value. Such measures include 
preventing children from being exposed to views inconsistent 
with those of their parents and warning children of dire 
consequences, such as spending eternity in hell, for those who 
reject the teachings of the parents' faith. 
In view of the limited nature of the regulations I proposed for 
private schools, and in light of the fact that less than 20 percent 
of children's awake hours are spent in school, it is absurd to 
suggest that the state regulation of curriculum and pedagogical 
practices in private schools that I urged would amount to a state 
monopoly over children's upbringing. What I recommended is 
simply some effort on the part of the state to ensure that no 
parents have a monopoly over their children's upbringing, that in 
the less than 20 percent of their daily lives when children are in 
school they receive some influence other than that of their 
parents and their parents' religious community, and that they 
receive instruction designed to foster a capacity to take an 
external stance toward the beliefs and values impressed on them 
by their parents and by other members of their parents' 
community. This should include exposure to some range of 
perspectives in our society that diverge from that of the parents, 
presented in a way that encourages the students to see why 
reasonable people might hold them and that challenges students 
to evaluate the respective merits of various world views or specific 
beliefs from a standpoint other than just their parents' 
conception of the good or religious authority. Naturally, children 
21 See id. at 11-12, 184-85. 
22 See id. at 106-11. 
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in public schools should have this experience as well, and I 
regard it as a deficiency in the education many public schools 
provide that it does not include teaching about religion in a 
serious way.23 Again, though, it would be illogical to contend that 
the state should not require private schools to provide an 
autonomy-fostering education because not all public schools do it. 
And it is also irrelevant whether many religious schools already 
provide that sort of education; as long as some do not, the state 
has reason to establish a legal requirement that all do so. 
I have not yet considered, though, the most commonly 
advanced argument against state efforts to regulate the practices 
of religious schools to require the things that I said are 
constitutive of liberal education. This is the argument that 
parents are entitled to do what they want with their children 
regardless of what legislators or so-called experts in child welfare 
think is good or bad for the children. It is an argument many 
parents and religious organizations have advanced in state and 
federal courts in this country on the rare occasion when states 
have attempted to require parents or private schools to do 
something with respect to children's education that they did not 
want to do. 
Many people overstate the courts' responses to those 
arguments, contending that the courts have established a 
constitutional right of parents to depart from secular standards 
of child rearing when their religious beliefs so require. The 
courts have recognized that parents have a right to object on 
their own behalf to state child welfare laws that conflict with 
their religious beliefs, but have given effect to that right 
principally, and exclusively at the Supreme Court level, when the 
state could not, in the courts' view, show that the challenged laws 
in fact served children's temporal welfare. Thus, in each of the 
principal Supreme Court decisions striking down state education 
laws or requiring that some parents be exempted from them-
Meyer u. Nebraska, 24 Pierce u. Society of Sisters, 25 and Wisconsin 
u. Yode~6-the Court reasoned that enforcing the laws in 
23 See Emile Lester, Gratitude and Parents' Rights over Their Children's 
Religious Upbringing, 25 J. BELIEFS & VALUES 295, 297-98, 303-04 (2004); Emile 
Lester, Religious Autonomy and World Religions Education, 31 RELIGION & EDUC. 
62 (2004). 
24 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
25 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
26 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
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question served no legitimate state aim, because the states had 
not shown that any harm would befall the children at issue if the 
laws in question did not exist or were not applied to the parents 
involved.27 Even in Yoder-which many scholars treat as a 
Magna Carta of parental free-exercise rights even though the 
Court carefully limited its holding to the Amish-the Court 
emphasized that parental freedom and power, even when tied to 
relig~ous belief, are constrained by what the state views as the 
welfare of children.28 In contrast, in the two cases the Supreme 
Court decided in which the state was able to show that the 
challenged law did, from a secular perspective, protect children's 
welfare-Prince v. Massachusetts29 and Jehovah's Witnesses v. 
King County Hospitaz3°-the Court upheld the challenged law 
and rejected the parental free exercise claim. Thus, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence suggests that a parent's constitutional child-
rearing right operates only to resist application of laws that do 
not serve children's welfare from a secular perspective, even 
when parents object on the basis of religious belief. It does not 
entitle parents to choose or act in ways the state deems contrary 
to their children's welfare. 
Nevertheless, many people might claim that parents have a 
moral right against state regulation of the private schools that 
parents choose, even if the schools engage in practices that the 
state can show conflict with children's welfare as the state sees 
it. Some parents might, out of religious conviction, disvalue 
certain things the state believes all children should have-for 
example, exercises designed to foster critical thinking and 
instruction in gender equality. As to other things that the state 
27 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30, 233-34. "This case, of course, is not one in 
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, 
peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred." Id. at 
230; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (noting that nothing in the record indicated any 
educational deprivation of students at private schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 
(concluding that a prohibition of German language instruction was "arbitrary and 
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state," because 
"there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to 
protect the child's health"). 
28 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34. 
29 321 U.S. 158 (1944). "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control .... [T]he state 
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things 
affecting the child's welfare ... . "/d. at 166-67. 
30 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), af{'d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
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would require, some parents might see them as having some 
value but might believe that value outweighed by spiritual 
exigencies. For example, they might perceive some value in 
children learning scientific methods as soon as they are able to 
comprehend them, because they want their children to succeed 
academically and to be able to pursue careers that require a 
science background, but they might also perceive spiritual 
danger in such instruction because they fear children will 
develop an overly rationalistic outlook or will apply scientific 
methods to deconstruct certain religious beliefs that have 
scientific implications. Many people might say that such parents 
are morally entitled to decide whether their children will receive 
such instruction, based on the parents' own balancing of the 
various interests they believe their children have, including 
spiritual interests. Parents claim such an entitlement, not only 
in connection with children's education, but also in connection 
with children's health care and other aspects of children's lives. 
In Religious Schools v. Children's Rights, I explained why 
the very idea of parental child-rearing rights is wrong and why 
the Supreme Court's creation of a constitutional parental right, 
however limited, was a mistake from the outset.31 The 
explanation rests on certain subtle, but important, distinctions. 
Importantly, though, it does not rest on a belief that children 
ought to be liberated from all governance or should be made 
"creatures of the state." One important distinction is that 
between exercising authority as a matter of one's own 
entitlement and exercising authority and providing care for 
another as a matter of privilege and in a fiduciary capacity. This 
is a familiar distinction, one often applied to leadership positions, 
including leadership positions within religious communities; 
those in positions of power are said to be stewards, not entitled to 
the offices they hold or to any powers attached to those offices 
but rather called upon to serve as agents for those whom they 
serve and/or for the higher authority that selected them for the 
office. Professor Broyde draws this distinction and, significantly, 
suggests that Jewish law conceptualizes the parental role with 
respect to education as a fiduciary one.32 Another distinction is 
between parents objecting to laws or to behavior by other persons 
31 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 62-67. 
32 See Michael J . Broyde, Why Educate?: A Jewish Law Perspective, 44 J. CATH. 
LEGAL STUD. 179 (2005). 
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with respect to children on the basis of the parents' own interests 
and rights, on the one hand, and on the other hand, parents or 
other agents objecting to laws or behaviors impacting children on 
the basis of rights of the children. With respect to each 
distinction, I argued that adopting the latter approach was 
morally and legally requisite because of the moral and legal 
standing of children as distinct persons. 33 
The first step in this argument was to show how entirely 
anomalous parental control rights are. In every other area of life, 
including the care of incompetent adults, our legal and moral 
cultures reject the idea that any person is entitled to control the 
life of another. We long ago rejected the idea that husbands are 
entitled to control the lives of their wives. And even when 
persons become caretakers for an elderly parent, or become or 
remain caretakers for a mentally disabled offspring who has 
passed the age of majority, we do not speak of those caretakers, 
in law or in public discourse, as having a right-that is, an 
entitlement in their own name-to decide what church the 
incompetent adults will belong to or what medical care they will 
receive. Rather, we speak of the caretakers as having authority 
to make some decisions in behalf of their wards because, and only 
because and to the extent that, it is in the best interests of the 
persons cared for, from a secular perspective, that the caretakers 
have that authority. And the law constrains that authority 
within bounds established by the state's own judgment of the 
incompetent adult's welfare. Thus, for example, if the law 
mandated certain vaccinations for residents of nursing homes, we 
would be taken aback by someone whose parent is a resident and 
unable to make medical decisions for herself coming forward and 
claiming that this law violates his-that is, the offspring's-
rights. We would think that person failed to understand 
something very basic about the nature and purpose of rights. 
And we see in court battles over medical care of incompetent 
adults-for example, parental requests for sterilization of 
mentally disabled daughters and parental requests to continue or 
discontinue artificial life support for an adult offspring in a 
persistent vegetative state-that the legal analysis and public 
33 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 121- 22. 
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discussion attribute rights only to the incompetent adult and not 
to her parents or other guardian. 34 
I extracted from various court opinions and philosophical 
writings the moral reasoning underlying the rejection of other-
determining rights in contexts other than child rearing. The 
reasoning was in part simply that, as a historical matter, the 
posited moral basis for any of us having any legal rights is a 
moral entitlement to personal integrity or self-determination, a 
moral basis that does not encompass control over the body, mind, 
or life course of another person. This puts the burden on 
defenders of parental rights to demonstrate the moral 
appropriateness of extending the concept of a right beyond the 
scope of its historical moral justification, to demonstrate that 
moral entitlements can arise on some grounds other than the 
integrity of one's own self and control over just one's own life-
that is, one's own beliefs and decisions as to one's own career, 
residence, attendance at religious services, and so forth. 
Of course, the notion of parental rights also has a long 
historical pedigree. The argument is that there is an 
inconsistency in our cultural practices, an incompatibility 
between our general principles concerning respect for persons 
and concerning the nature of rights, on the one hand, and our 
specific attitudes toward, and treatment of, children. It is 
precisely by identifying and rectifying such incongruities between 
general principles and specific practices that we have improved 
ourselves as moral persons and as a moral community over the 
centuries. This is, for example, how we eventually came to 
embrace social and legal equality for Mrican-Americans and for 
women in this country; we recognized the contradictions in our 
beliefs and behaviors. Rights of dominion over Mrican-
Americans and women also seemed natural and divinely 
ordained to people in this country at one time. Is treatment of 
children as objects of others' rights another instance of an 
indefensible inconsistency in our moral practices? Or is there a 
good argument to be made for retaining this anomalous practice? 
34 See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1416-20 (1994) (reviewing the 
Supreme Court's treatment of incompetent adults and children); Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 
1986 DUKE L.J . 806, 821-22 (1986) (indicating that the parents' interests will not be 
considered in protecting their mentally retarded child from an unwanted 
pregnancy). 
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Recall that any such argument would have to be addressed 
to state actors, because the ultimate question is whether the law 
should recognize a right of parents to control their children's 
upbringing, a right that would operate to enable parents to act in 
opposition to what state decision makers find to be conducive to 
children's welfare. Why should a legislator or judge establish 
such a right rather than embodying in the law only rights for 
children themselves in connection with their education and other 
aspects of their upbringing? Rights for children would be, at 
least for young children, not choice-protecting rights-that is, 
rights to decide for themselves what sort of school they would 
attend-but rather interest-protecting rights, such as a right to a 
form of schooling that satisfies their developmental interests. 
Children's rights would likely entail assigning some decision-
making authority to parents because, and insofar as, this is 
conducive to the children's welfare, but they would also likely 
constrain parental authority in significant ways, just as they 
constrain the authority of caretakers for incompetent adults. 
What justification could legislators or courts have for conferring 
rights on parents instead of on children in connection with 
fundamental aspects of children's lives such as their education? 
A few arguments are easily dismissed. One is that God says 
it should be so. As noted above, state actors, while recognizing 
that most citizens do believe in a god or gods, are not free to 
make decisions themselves, in their official capacity, on the basis 
of assumptions about what any one of those gods has 
commanded. None of us should be comfortable with state actors 
doing that even if today they are likely to do so on the basis of 
what we believe God has said rather than on the basis of what 
someone else believes God has said. Tomorrow it might be 
otherwise, and today it would constitute too great a threat to the 
sense of security and belongingness of some of our fellow citizens 
and would be contrary to a proper respect for their equal 
personhood. To avoid religious civil war, to facilitate harmonious 
social interaction in an ideologically diverse world, and to respect 
the equal standing of those who do not share our conception of 
the good, we expect our legislators and judges to find more 
neutral justifications for their decisions, and we believe that we 
have found that in secular understandings of human welfare. No 
one expects that this political principle will be fully satisfying to 
all persons at all times, but liberal political theorists believe all 
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reasonable persons should accept it as a compromise that is 
better in a practical sense than the alternative of majoritarian 
theocracy and that expresses the respect we should have for each 
other as morally equal persons. 
An argument somewhat akin to, and often "code" for, an 
argument based on divine command is one based on natural law 
or natural rights. Many people, recognizing that no one will be 
persuaded if they base a claim on an assertion that "my god says 
so," translate that assertion into one that "nature says so." There 
is a large literature today on the validity of natural law or 
natural rights claims. There are questions about what "nature" 
means, how it speaks to us, and who is competent to interpret 
what it says. The basis usually offered for discerning a command 
of natural law, when religious authority is not appealed to, is 
historical social practice or tradition, on the implicit assumption 
that whatever practices have evolved are "natural" in some 
sense. 
Even if we concede some authority to history and tradition, 
as moral agents we are expected to step back from what we have 
done in the past and to reassess it, and doing so has led to what 
we regard as moral progress over the centuries. As suggested 
above, some practices and attitudes that most people in the 
United States today regard as immoral-slavery and 
subordination of women being standard examples-were once 
defended as natural, as dictated by natural law and the natural 
order of things, and were firmly grounded in tradition. So too 
was instrumental and inhumane treatment of incompetent 
adults. We have rejected specific beliefs and practices after 
concluding that they were inconsistent with general principles 
that themselves are the outgrowth of our collective history. Our 
history does not reflect perfect moral consistency, because we are 
not perfect beings. Part of our perceived mission in the world is 
to achieve greater moral consistency, to advance each generation 
in our moral understandings and in our ethics, rather than to 
remain always at the level achieved by our forbearers, however 
much we admire them. The claim here is that making children 
the objects of others' rights, even if those others are loving 
parents, is inconsistent with what we-including those attracted 
to the idea of natural law-generally believe is entailed in 
respecting the personhood of others. 
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Another easily dismissed argument for making an exception 
to general principles concerning rights in the case of parents 
raising children is that children are incapable of possessing 
rights because they are not autonomous. The reality today is 
that children have many legal rights, just as incompetent adults 
have many legal rights, and others can be and are given the legal 
power to act in behalf of children to effectuate those rights. For 
example, a newborn, like an elderly person who has lost his 
mental capacity and like a mentally handicapped adult, can hold 
property rights. And, in fact, many state laws speak of children 
having a right to an education. Moreover, talk of children having 
moral rights of various sorts is quite common, even among those 
who are proponents of strong parental rights. So a defense of 
parental rights cannot rest on a supposition that someone needs 
rights against state action impacting children and that children 
themselves cannot be the bearers of those rights. They can be, 
and in contexts other than parental objections to state child-
rearing norms they are viewed as such. 35 
Thus, whatever protections there need to be for children's 
interests can be embodied in rights for children themselves. This 
belies the most common argument for parents' rights-namely, 
that they are necessary to protect children's interests. Any 
interests the state perceives children to have it can protect by 
recognizing a right of the children and by authorizing certain 
persons, such as parents or guardians ad litem, to assert those 
rights in legal forums. If parents believe a particular regulation 
applied to private schools is contrary to their children's well-
being, they should be able to go to court and assert that the state 
is violating their children's rights because the regulation is 
contrary to certain of their children's interests. The difficulty for 
many parents, though, would be in identifying interests of their 
children that a court could deem to exist and that are connected 
with their-the parents'-religious beliefs. They would need to 
convince a court to accept that the children have certain interests 
even if the court does not itself adopt, as it must not, the parents' 
religious beliefs. They would need to have some non-religious 
foundation for ascribing certain interests to their children, and 
perhaps to children in general. 
35 I present a more extended analysis of this issue in a forthcoming book, JAMES 
G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (forthcoming 2006). 
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But what if the only interests of their children that they 
believe are threatened are spiritual interests? I have said that 
the state cannot assume that children have particular spiritual 
interests, because that would require the state to assume the 
truth of particular religious beliefs, which means that the state 
cannot create rights for children designed to protect particular 
spiritual interests. But if children do have spiritual interests, 
how are they to be served? For the state to ignore them entirely 
could result in state action that harms those interests. Is that 
what liberalism requires, that what might be children's most 
vital interests are put at serious risk by making the state act as 
if it is agnostic about religious belief? Or must it allow parents to 
define those interests and to direct children's lives accordingly? 
These are not easy questions, and I think Professor 
Scaperlanda underestimates the difficulty in answering them. 
He assumes that children do have spiritual interests, and 
spiritual interests of a particular sort, without explaining why 
the state should agree with him or should assume that (all?) 
parents are correct in their own views about children's spiritual 
interests, a view that would be incoherent or radically 
relativistic. He leaps too readily from the premise that children 
do have spiritual interests, and from the premise that the state 
cannot fulfill children's spiritual needs, to the conclusion that 
parents are entitled to define and to act as they see fit to fulfill 
such needs. And he offers us no way to think about the bounds of 
parental entitlement. Yet presumably he and Professor Smolin, 
like all other defenders of parental free exercise rights whom I 
have encountered, believe there must be some bounds, that 
parents should not be entitled to do absolutely whatever they 
believe to be required by divine command. Defenders of such 
rights usually throw out some vague standard like "grievous 
harm," "excessive harm," or "unreasonable conduct" to define 
their position on permissible legal restrictions on parental child-
rearing freedom. They not only decline to give enough content to 
the standard to make it meaningful, but they also decline to 
provide any normative basis for imposing any standard or 
limitation. Who says what is harmful? Who says how much 
harm is grievous or excessive? Who balances such supposed 
harm against what the parents believe are the child's spiritual 
interests? Who says what is reasonable? One sometimes gets 
the impression that advocates for parental religious rights 
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believe they themselves, and they alone, are in a position to 
decide such matters. It is not so simple. 
Suppose, for example, that the state petitioned to terminate 
the parental rights of Abraham after learning that he had 
prepared to burn to death his son Isaac. The state assumes on 
secular grounds that it is in Isaac's interests to stay alive and not 
to feel that his life is constantly in danger because his father's 
god might change its mind and command that Abraham go 
through with the killing next time. Today, in the real world, in 
the United States, preparing to burn one's child to death would 
certainly lead state authorities to remove the child from one's 
custody, and it would likely lead to termination of parental rights 
absent strong evidence that one was firmly committed to never 
again pursue such an aim regardless of what one might believe 
one's god has commanded. 
But suppose Abraham defends himself by saying not just 
that God commanded him to kill Isaac and that he himself would 
have suffered divine retribution if he had disobeyed, which is the 
only motivation apparent from the Old Testament account, 36 but 
also that he believed that Isaac would be better off if God's 
command were obeyed-for example, that God would give Isaac 
eternal bliss in heaven if Abraham sacrificed him. Furthermore, 
Abraham says he would only kill Isaac in the future if he 
believed that to be true, because he loves Isaac very much and 
would never do anything he thought harmful to Isaac. How 
should the state respond to this defense? Many proponents of 
parental religious rights cite religiously-motivated killing of 
children, or allowing children to die from curable illness, as 
examples of something they would legally prohibit, and I suspect 
most would endorse the existing rule, as described above, which 
would likely result in the removal of Isaac and termination of 
Abraham's parental rights. But why? Why should the state 
elevate what it believes to be the secular interests of the child 
above what the parent believes to be the child's spiritual 
interests in this or any other type of case? If it does so in this 
case, why not also when what is at issue is whether girls 
attending religious schools learn that they are as good in every 
36 See Genesis 22:1-19 (New American). Indeed, this account creates an 
impression of remarkable callousness on the part of Abraham with respect to his 
son's life. 
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way as boys and can pursue any occupations and roles in life that 
they wish? 
The two cases cannot be distinguished on the basis of 
societal consensus-that is, on the basis of an assertion that 
there is a consensus in our society today that killing children is 
bad but not a consensus on gender equality. Many laws and 
regulations, including regulations governing the public schools 
that educate 90 percent of the nation's children, reflect a 
consensus concerning gender equality. 37 The same is true of 
autonomy-promoting education. Those who oppose these things 
are a small minority. So head counting is not a promising route 
for those who would defend a parental right to exemption from 
such education regulations but not a parental right to exemption 
from legal prohibitions on endangering children's lives. 
Certainly universal acceptance cannot be the general standard 
for legal regulation of conduct, for then, as noted above, religious 
objectors should have an exemption not only to every legal rule 
about parents' treatment of their own children but also to laws 
designed to protect children who are not in one's custody and 
laws designed to protect other adults, including spouses, co-
workers, pregnant women, and so forth.38 
This last point suggests another distinction that defenders of 
parental religious rights must make-namely, between one's 
views about the spiritual interests of children in one's custody 
and one's views about the spiritual interests of anyone else in the 
world. I am not entitled to define my neighbor's spiritual 
interests, or my co-workers' spiritual interests, or even my 
spouse's spiritual interests, and on that basis to command an 
exemption from generally applicable laws restricting my 
treatment of those people. It is not sufficient, to make this 
distinction, to point out that my neighbors, co-workers, and 
spouse are able to determine their own spiritual interests. First, 
it is also true with respect to incompetent adults that no one else, 
not even their guardians, is deemed entitled to define their 
spiritual interests and to have the law accommodate the 
37 See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1332-38 (reviewing statutory provisions that 
promote equality among students). 
38 With respect to abortion, there are good arguments to be made that women 
should not be able to do it--especially arguments appealing to the rights of unborn 
children-but what is universally recognized not to be a good argument is: "I 
personally am entitled to stop women from doing this because my religion commands 
me to do so." 
224 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:195 
conclusions reached about that. Second, my neighbor's newborn 
child is also not able to determine his or her own spiritual 
interests, so why should I not be entitled to do so, and on that 
basis determine, for example, whether the child will receive 
vaccinations? Third, other competent adults could be wrong 
about their own spiritual interests, or might, like a newborn 
child, simply never think about spiritual interests. Why would I 
not have a right to decide for them if either of those things is true 
or if I believe either to be true? 
The only practical and potentially relevant differences 
between a child in one's custody, who might or might not be one's 
biological offspring, and most of these other categories of people, 
are that the child is in one's possession and one has legal 
obligations to that child as a result of that possession, that 
entrustment. The latter cannot suffice to support objections to 
state regulation of parenting, however, because the essence of 
those claims is a request to be exempted from certain legal 
obligations, and it makes no sense to say that one is entitled to 
depart from one's legal obligations toward one's child because one 
has legal obligations to the child. The fact that one is under legal 
duties is a basis for demanding freedom from interference in 
carrying out those legal duties, but not a basis for insisting that 
one should not have those duties. What about a claim on the 
basis of moral obligations? Well, in effect, parents' legal 
obligations reflect a legislative judgment about the moral 
obligations parents owe to children, or, in other words, about the 
moral rights of the children. So a parental-rights argument 
founded on the parents' view of their moral obligation is an 
argument that the state should accept the parents' moral outlook 
in the specific case of their children. And that just begs the 
question of why the state should adopt or defer to individual 
parents' views, particularly where the parents' moral outlook is 
contrary to what the state believes to be the moral rights of the 
child. 
Here one might object that my reasoning rests on a 
supposition that the state, while eschewing any authority to 
decide religious questions and remaining agnostic about religious 
beliefs, is competent to decide moral questions. Moral beliefs are 
also contested and, in fact, many believe, must be grounded in 
religious belief. There seems something illicit in relying in one 
part of my argument on state neutrality with respect to religion 
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and in another part relying on state judgments about moral 
rights and duties. Here is how I would respond to this seeming 
inconsistency: First, I would point out that a great number of our 
laws rest on these two suppositions even though they stand 
somewhat in tension with each other-that is, that the state may 
not adopt or endorse religious beliefs, and that the law should 
embody moral beliefs. Racial discrimination is unlawful because 
it violates the moral rights of individuals, not because it is 
contrary to the Bible per se. Women are legally entitled to 
pursue careers outside the home even after marrying, because 
they have a moral right to do so regardless of what the Bible or 
the Koran might have to say about that. 
Second, I would suggest that state conclusions about moral 
rights and duties emerge from perceiving an overlapping 
consensus among people holding diverse conceptions of the good, 
a consensus around principles that can be explained in terms of 
shared values like happiness, autonomy, and respect for 
personhood that are generally viewed today as not requiring 
reference to religious texts or divine authority for their 
legitimacy and force. At the same time, the state must 
sometimes reject more specific beliefs about moral rights and 
duties, even when they are widely held, because they are 
inconsistent with more general widely-held moral principles. 
That is what I suggested above must be done in defining the 
respective rights of children and parents. The more general 
principle that no person should be made the object of another's 
rights, a principle that we today apply even to non-autonomous 
persons who are adults, I have argued, should be applied also to 
children. At the most basic level, the state and private parties 
should treat every person as an end in himself or herself, and not 
as an instrument for the expression or gratification of others, no 
matter how well intentioned those others are. 
Thus, even if one assumes that parents' possession of, and 
obligations with respect to, children make child rearing 
distinguishable from all other situations, the argument for 
parents' rights based on parents' legal and moral obligations 
fails. But these facts actually do not distinguish child rearing 
from every other context considered above, because incompetent 
adults can also be in the possession and care of others, including 
their legal parents. Yet, as noted, in that context we have 
collectively rejected the idea that persons cared for should be 
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viewed and treated as objects of others' rights. We view 
incompetent adults themselves as rights holders in connection 
with their care and the course of their lives, and we view their 
caretakers as fiduciaries. 
Parents' rights thus cannot be defended as necessary to 
protect the interests of children. Arguments for parents' rights 
based on interests of persons other than the children also fail. 
Parents' own interests are insufficient, just as the interests 
anyone might have in dictating the life of other persons who are 
not their children, no matter how strong those interests, do not 
justify assigning them other-determining rights. I might believe 
that I have as great an interest in dictating the course of my 
elderly parents' life or the life of my neighbor's children or the 
actions of pregnant women as I have in directing the lives of my 
daughters. Yet a claim for a right based on those interests would 
be a non-starter in our legal and moral culture today, no matter 
how much I have given to or sacrificed for the person whose life I 
wish to control. To make others objects of my rights in order to 
serve my interests would be clearly to treat them instrumentally, 
contrary to the respect they are owed as persons. The same is 
true of arguments based on supposed societal interests such as 
diversity. For the state to act to sacrifice what it views as the 
welfare of individual children in order to serve such corporate 
interests would also treat the children instrumentally and 
therefore morally inappropriately. We competent adults would 
surely be offended if someone suggested giving others a right of 
control over our lives in order to serve such societal aims, even if 
the right would arise only if and when we became unable to 
direct our own lives. 39 
In sum, defenders of parental entitlement, as distinguished 
from a parental privilege to exercise authority for the 
furtherance of children's welfare and rights, need to supply a 
plausible argument for such an entitlement that would not, if its 
premises were generalized, also justify giving some persons an 
entitlement to control the lives of others who are not their 
children. The things people ordinarily think of as justifying 
parental rights--children's dependency, parents' sacrifices and 
sense of responsibility, and the value of diversity-would apply 
39 I also reject the empirical claim that entitling parents to choose illiberal 
schools for their children is conducive to diversity. See DWYER, supra note 3, at 97-
99. 
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equally to some other categories of persons with respect to whom 
we have rejected the idea that others are entitled to direct their 
lives. The closest analogy is to incompetent adults, as to whom 
we have adopted a fiduciary, rather than an ownership or 
entitlement, model of care giving. 
There is still the very large question of what content the 
state should give to children's rights. Many parents might accept 
the idea that child rearing should be about their children's 
interests and rights, not their own, and might accept that they 
should think less about what is owed to them-which would be 
the corollary of their having rights-and more about what they 
owe to their children. Yet they might insist that they are in the 
best position to identify their children's interests and so to give 
content to their children's rights. They know their children 
intimately, and they love their children like no one else does. 
The state, on the other hand, is a stranger to their children. How 
can it be consistent with a concern for children to give an 
impersonal stranger a substantial role in shaping their lives? 
I addressed this question to some extent above, in discussing 
children's spiritual interests. Here I will elaborate further on 
that issue and address some others as well. There are several 
points to be made in response to the "parents know best" line of 
reasoning. First, as noted above, no one seriously maintains that 
the state should not set the parameters of parental freedom. 
This is in part because everyone knows that not all parents love 
their children enough to refrain from acting in ways that the 
parents themselves know is harmful to the children. 
Second, the claim that parents know their children best is 
overstated. It is true that most parents are more familiar with 
the individual personalities of their children and with the past 
events of their children's lives than is anyone else. But many 
aspects of children's welfare are generic or nearly so-that is, 
certain things are true of all or most children. Thus, knowledge 
of those aspects of children's well-being does not depend on 
intimacy. In fact, many generic aspects of children's lives are 
known only by people who have devoted an extraordinary 
amount of time, even their entire careers, to learning about 
them. This is true of much of children's development and health. 
It would be a rare parent indeed who was not only an expert with 
respect to her children's personalities and histories, but also with 
respect to developmental psychology, educational theory, 
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medicine, and nutrition. With respect to each major area of 
children's lives, it seems safe to say that the vast majority of 
parents know quite little. Very few parents know as much about 
how to educate children as do professional educators, and most 
parents implicitly recognize this by seeking schools for their 
children that employ well-trained and credentialed teachers. 
Very few parents know as much about health care as do doctors. 
The state has agencies that employ and draw information from 
people whose careers are devoted to studying children's welfare, 
including their cognitive development, and it is largely for that 
reason that we repose some trust in state agencies to establish 
minimum requirements for care and treatment of children. 
Third, what is typically at stake in religiously-charged 
controversies over child rearing is not parental love or parental 
knowledge; rather, it is ideology and a clash of religious and 
secular values. Reference to parental love and knowledge is 
impertinent in these situations. The state's objection to certain 
illiberal practices is not that it believes that the parents do not 
love their children, nor that the parents are ignorant; it is that 
those practices are harmful to the children from a secular 
perspective and that the parents are not entitled to say that their 
religious perspective must control. If one accepts the explanation 
above as to why the very idea of parents' rights is misguided, one 
must, in order to defend the claim that the parents' religious 
perspective must control, explain why children have a right to 
that outcome. The state's position might be understood to assert 
that children have a right to protection of their secular interests 
until they become adults capable of deciding for themselves what 
religious beliefs, if any, they will hold, and what role any such 
beliefs will play in their lives, including whether they will 
sacrifice what is generally believed to be in their secular interests 
for the sake of religious duty or spiritual aspiration. Those who 
reject this position need to construct an argument to the effect 
that children have a right to have their secular interests 
sacrificed for the sake of what their parents believe to be 
required by religious command. And that argument needs to be 
one the state can accept and would find convincing, for as noted 
above, what religious objectors to state regulation of child rearing 
are demanding is not state inaction, but rather state action of a 
particular sort-namely, a state conferral on them of more 
extensive power over children's lives. I am not aware that 
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anyone has ever attempted to construct such an argument, and I 
very much doubt that it can successfully be done. 
One way to think about the content of children's rights that I 
find helpful is to imagine what rules I would want to apply to my 
situation if I were told that tomorrow I would be born again, in 
the temporal sense that I would start all over in my human life 
as a newborn child, and if I did not know anything else about my 
individual circumstances-in particular, not knowing who among 
the vast number of potential parents in our society would become 
my legal parents. The parents I will have could be people 
belonging to any one of the tremendous variety of religious 
denominations in America, people who have a very individualized 
set of religious beliefs, people who have no religious beliefs, or 
people who are atheistic. They could be Satanists or sun-
worshippers, people who believe that one should eat nothing but 
lettuce, or people who believe children grow spiritually through 
sexual intercourse with adults. In light of the enormous variety 
of possibilities, how would I want the state to go about deciding 
what the limits of parental power and freedom should be in the 
world I am about to reenter? 
I believe this thought experiment would lead to a conclusion 
that the state should rely on widely shared secular views of 
children's welfare or interests, but not on any particular religious 
beliefs per se. Unless one ascribes to a view that every child just 
has whatever interests are specified by the conception of the good 
of his or her parents, or that all efforts to identify interests of 
children are futile, one would want to guard against the 
possibility that the parents to whom one is assigned have beliefs 
inconsistent with one's interests. Everyone involved in these 
debates concedes this possibility when thinking about religious 
practices that seriously threaten children's health or safety, but 
without explanation, some refuse to acknowledge that the same 
possibility exists with respect to children's schooling. I believe 
that anyone reading this essay who thinks seriously about the 
prospect of reentering the world and being assigned to parents of 
unknown ideological outlook-parents whose beliefs could 
diverge widely not only from secular views about children's 
welfare but also from any religious beliefs the reader now holds-
will come to endorse a legal regime in which the state adopts the 
prevailing secular views concerning children's temporal welfare 
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and imposes on all parents restrictions on their child-rearing 
choices that reflect such views. 40 
That thought experiment is designed to model the reality of 
every newborn child today, to facilitate our putting ourselves in 
the place of each person who is actually entering the world now. 
It encourages us to see each newborn child as a morally distinct 
and equal person and to recognize the great hazard the state 
creates for children now by assigning them to parents adhering 
to any one of a vast variety of conceptions of the good without 
constraining in a significant way parental choices regarding 
children's intellectual, psychological, and emotional development. 
Another useful thought experiment might be to imagine that 
your own children, or your own nephews and nieces are, for some 
reason-for example, a family tragedy-randomly reassigned to 
another set of parents in our society-for example, through the 
adoption process. How comfortable would you be with the 
thought that they could be assigned to fundamentalist Muslims, 
fundamentalist Christians, parents in a cult like the Branch 
Davidians, members of the Ku Klux Klan, or parents adhering to 
any other lifestyle and ideological view? Would you not want the 
state to impose some restrictions and requirements with respect 
to their upbringing, including the kind of education they receive, 
to at least ensure that they will develop the capacity to question 
the beliefs their parents instill in them and perhaps also to 
ensure that they are prepared-even if they are girls-to pursue 
whatever careers are well suited to their native talents and 
abilities and self-chosen values? 
I will close by reiterating that ensuring every child a liberal 
education would not amount to standardizing children. Those 
adults who attended public schools ought to resent the frequent 
suggestion that state influence on education results in children 
being standardized, their individuality expunged. In addition, in 
and of itself, imposing certain requirements on private schools 
has no implications for children's home life or for the freedom of 
parents to teach and model their beliefs and values. Again, the 
experience of the 90 percent of adults in this country who 
attended public schools is telling; the vast majority describe 
40 I develop this line of reasoning, which was inspired by John Rawls's idea of 
deciding on basic principles for a society behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance as to 
one's individual characteristics, more fully in chapter 6 of Religious Schools v. 
Children's Rights. See DWYER, supra note 3, at 148-77. 
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themselves as religious, and I have never heard of any who 
complained that they were deprived of the opportunity to have a 
religious upbringing insulated from liberal ideas and secular 
views and values. In fact, Catholic parents are increasingly 
comfortable sending their children to public schools, believing 
that their children can still have a Catholic upbringing, can still 
learn the tenets of the Catholic faith, and can still live their lives 
as Catholics, because these parents recognize that they still 
control most of their children's daily lives and still have the 
opportunity to spend a great amount of time instructing their 
children and modeling their beliefs. I have argued simply that no 
parent is entitled to complete control over children's intellectual 
development and that children cannot plausibly be said to have a 
right that their parents have such complete control. Rather, 
every child has a moral right that at least this one limited aspect 
of their lives-their schooling-be governed by liberal principles 
whether or not their parents accept those principles. 
I am not aware of any religion whose basic precepts are 
inherently opposed to this position. I would be very interested to 
see a theological analysis within the religious traditions 
addressed by the other contributors or any other tradition of 
what adherents should believe about the respective authority of 
parents and the rest of society, as represented by the state, over 
child rearing, and of what specific restrictions the state ought to 
impose on parental freedom, if they accepted certain of the 
assumptions and conclusions relied on above-for example, that 
children are neither property nor appendages of their parents, 
that children's separate personhood gives rise to some moral 
obligations both on the part of parents and on the part of the 
state, that some parents manifest little love for their children, 
that most parents are not experts regarding many aspects of 
child rearing, that the state cannot be expected to adopt ·any 
parent's religious beliefs or assume that such beliefs are true, 
and that the beliefs parents in our society have about what God 
commands and about the spiritual interests of their children are 
infinitely varied and in some cases directly contrary to 
empirically supported secular views about children's welfare. It 
is not obvious to me, based on my limited understanding of 
various faiths, that such an analysis would necessarily lead in 
many instances to conclusions much different from my own. 
